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Abstract
We analyze how a principal should set his promotion rule when the agents have career
concerns and compete with each other to get promoted. When the principal uses
promotion as an incentive scheme to increase the agents’ effort, the rule may or may
not favor the agent with higher expected ability. However, when the principal uses
promotion to pick the best agent, the rule always gives higher promotion probability
to the agent with higher expected ability.
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1. Introduction
Although the principal-agent literature prescribe the use of contracts linking agents’
performance and reward to provide work incentive, not only the explicit incentives
are rarely seen in governments, where a worker’s pay is based on his seniority and
job level, but Medoff and Abraham (1980) find no evidence that private firms adopt
the pay-for-performance system. Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988) argue that the
pay-for-performance system is not popular because it is so powerful that it creates
adverse side effects: workers putting effort only in the activities that count toward
their performance. (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) provide a theory to explain this
effect), lobbying or bribing for better scores (the influence behavior. (See Milgrom and
Roberts (1992))), and hoarding effort to have an easier target next year (the ratchet
effect. (See Freixax, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985))). Furthermore, the system faces the
difficulties in specifying objective performancemeasurement, and has to deal with the
mistrust when it relies instead on subjective measurement.
Besides the explicit incentive, in dynamic settings the principal can resort to implicit
incentives, including promotion-based incentives and agents’ career concern – work-
ing in order to impress the job market. When an organization does not use explicit
incentives and use promotions instead, Bakeret al (1988) argue that promotions are
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used for two purposes: first to provide incentive for the agents who value the higher
positions to work harder; second, to screen employees so that agents are assigned to
the jobs that fit them best.
However, considering the promotion process as a tournament, they claim that the
two roles of promotions are not compatible. For those who have no chance of winning
the positions, or those who have sure chance of winning, promotion cannot provide
incentive. When employees are alike, the tournament for promotion can provide most
incentive, but then the matching is not important. When people are different, the
tournament offers little signal about who is the best for the higher-level job. Worse
yet, when the requirements for the higher-level job differ much from those in the
tournament stage, the winner in the tournament is not likely to be the right person;
namely, the Peter Principle occurs.
Since promotions occur in dynamic settings, the agents have career concern as
well when they choose their effort facing promotion-based incentives. Therefore pro-
motions might perform better than what (Baker et al., 1988) picture. Furthermore a
principal can change the rules of promotions to fit his goal. Our paper aims to analyze
the incentives of agents when both the tournament effect and the career concern
effect are present, and the principal’s optimal promotion rule.
So far, it seems that the papers discussing tournament leave career concern
untouched, and those analyzing career concern have no tournaments. Lazear and
Rosen (1981) model promotions as one-period tournaments, and argue that when it
is costly to monitor agents’ effort and outputs, risk-averse agents prefer the reward
system based on relative performance (rank-based) to one based on absolute per-
formance. Green and Stokey (1983) analyze how the information structure affects the
advantage of tournaments. A tournament performs better when the common shock
is important, but worse when the shock is unimportant.
Malcomson (1984) traces the advantage of rank-based reward system to the prin-
cipal’s commitment to giving rewards, which in the output-based reward system he
can forfeit by claiming that none fulfills the standard. The reward in a tournament
can be purely monetary, not necessarily promotion. Fairburn and Malcomson (1994)
show that if the reward is monetary, the workers might put effort in bribery or other
influence activity. If the reward is promotion, and the higher-level job is important to
the organization, then the organization will be less affected by influence activity since
the personal favor the principal gets is small, compared with the organization’s future.
Fairburn and Malcomson (2001) show that when the agents are risk averse, there can
be too little or too much promotion. Fama (1980) first discusses career concerns. He
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conjectures that the labor market provides enough discipline that contracts are not
needed. Holmstrom (1999) shows that the incentive from career concerns is too much
for an agent in the early stage of his career, and too little for one near retirement. Hence
it is necessary to have contract. In different setups, Holmstrom and Costa (1986) and
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) discuss optimal incentive contracts when there is career
concern.
Costa (1988) introduces the signaling role of job assignment and promotion. The job
market observeswhat aworker’s job is andwhether he is promoted, but not his output,
which only his current employer observes. So the worker’s internal reputation differs
with his external reputation. The model shows that there is a misassignment of the
worker to jobs and too little promotion. Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) analyze
the connection between workers’ career concern and job assignment in governments.
Meyer and Vickers (1997) consider the interactions between the explicit incentives,
which are contracts linking performance to pay, and the implicit incentives, including
career concern and the ratchet effect.
A principal canmanipulate the rules of promotion to fit his goals. Meyer (1991) shows
that when effort do not affect output in a tournament of several rounds, it is optimal to
favor the leader of early rounds by giving him advantage in the later rounds. However,
Lazear and Rosen (1981) think it is necessary to handicap the leader in the tournament
so that both the leader and the followers have incentive to keep on competing. We
will explore the optimal bias in the promotion when there are both career concern and
tournament effects.
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we lay out our model. In section 3 we derive the
workers’ equilibrium effort given a promotion rule. Then we do the comparative statics
in section 4. In section 5 we discuss the optimal promotion rules under two different
goals. Section 6 is the conclusion.
2. The Model
Consider a firm (the principal) who hires two workers, 𝑖 = 𝑥, 𝑧. There are two periods,
𝑡 = 1, 2. In period 1, the two workers are assigned the same job 𝐿. At the start of period
2, after observing the two workers’ period-1 outputs, the firm promotes one worker
to job𝐻 and assigns the other the same job 𝐿. In both periods, worker i’s output in job
𝐿, 𝑦𝐿𝑖𝑡 , is the sum of his ability 𝜃𝑖, his effort 𝑎𝐿𝑖𝑡 , and disturbance 𝜀𝐿𝑖𝑡 ,
𝑦𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖 + 𝑎𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝐿𝑖𝑡 (2.1)
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Output in job𝐻 , 𝑦𝐻𝑖 , is affected more by workers’ ability. Given the worker’s ability,
his effort 𝑎𝐻𝑖 , and disturbance 𝜀𝐻𝑖 , the output is
𝑦𝐻𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖 + 𝑎𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝐻𝑖𝑡 (2.2)
where 𝛾 > 1, Hence, other things equal, the firm will promote the worker with higher
ability. The firm and the workers are risk neutral. The cost of effort to worker 𝑖 in job
𝐿 is 𝛽(𝑎𝐿𝑖𝑡 )
2/2, and is 𝛽(𝑎𝐻𝑖𝑡 )
2/2 in job 𝐻 , 𝛽 > 0.
Before production begins, none of the firm, the labor market, and the workers know
either worker’s ability, and they believe that 𝜃𝑖 is normally distributedwith mean 𝜃𝑖 and
variance 𝜎2𝑖 , 𝑖 = 𝑥, 𝑧 and 𝜃𝑥 is independent of 𝜃𝑧. Note that the two workers’ expected
ability can be different, whichmight be due to different schooling or training ofworkers
before being hired by the firm. The disturbance terms are normally distributed with
mean zero and variance (𝜑𝑗𝑖 )
2, 𝑗 = 1, 2 and are independent of 𝜃𝑖. Let 𝜖= (𝜀𝐿𝑥 , 𝜀𝐿𝑧 )), then












where 𝜌 is the coefficient of correlation. If 𝜌= 0, then the twoworkers’ outputs in period
1 are independent variables. Let∆𝑦 =𝑦𝐿𝑥1−𝑦𝐿𝑧1, ∆𝜃 = 𝜃𝑥−𝜃𝑧,∆𝜀 = 𝜀𝑥1−𝜀𝑧1, and∆𝑎 =𝑎𝐿𝑥1−
𝑎𝐿𝑧1, then
∆𝑦 =∆𝜃+∆𝑎+∆𝜀 (2.3)
Let 𝑉 (∆𝜃) , 𝑉 (∆𝜖) , and 𝜗 be the variance of ∆𝜃, ∆𝜖 and ∆𝑦 respectively, then
𝑉 (∆𝜃) = 𝜎2𝑥 + 𝜎2𝑧 ; 𝑉 (∆𝜖) = (𝜑𝐿𝑥 )2 + (𝜑𝐿𝑧 )2 − 2𝜌𝜑𝐿𝑥𝜑𝐿𝑧 , and 𝜗= 𝑉 (∆𝜃)+𝑉(∆𝜖). The timing
of the two-period game is as follows. We depict the promotion rule by a number 𝑐. In
period 1, the firm announces before production starts that worker 𝑥 will be promoted
if ∆𝑦 > 𝑐, 𝑧 be promoted if ∆𝑦 < 𝑐, and each has equal probability to be promoted if
∆𝑦 = 𝑐. If 𝑐 > 0 (𝑐 < 0), then the rule favors worker 𝑧(𝑥). Worker 𝑖 receives a wage 𝑤𝑖1,
and exerts effort 𝑎𝐿𝑖1. The firm cannot observe the effort of workers, but their outputs
are observable by the firm and the labor market. The outputs are not verifiable and
therefore 𝑤𝑖1 cannot be contingent on outputs.
In period 2, the promoted worker gets a wage 𝑊𝑖 and spend effort 𝑎𝐻𝑖 ; the other
worker gets 𝑤𝑘2, and puts in effort 𝑎𝐿𝑘2. Then the outputs are realized. Since the labor
market has the same information about the workers’ ability, the workers cannot get a
higher wage from other firms and so they stay with the firm if the wage offers are the
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same. Assume further that the firm will not hire someone from outside to fill in the
job 𝐻 . The price of outputs is 1, and there is no discounting between the two periods.
We solve the game by backward induction. First we derive workers’ effort in the two
periods as functions of 𝑐, the promotion rule, and then solve the firm’s optimal 𝑐.
3. The Efforts of Workers
We start with period 2. After observing period-1 outputs 𝑦𝐿𝑥1 and 𝑦𝐿𝑧1, if the firm (and
the labor market) presumes that 𝑎𝐿𝑥1 and 𝑎𝐿𝑧1 were the efforts of workers, then he can
subtract from 𝑦𝐿𝑥1 and 𝑦𝐿𝑧1 the workers’ effort to update his belief about their ability.
Denote ∆𝑎 =𝑎𝐿𝑥1 − 𝑎𝐿𝑧1 the expected effort difference, and ∆𝜃 = 𝜃𝑥 − 𝜃𝑧 the difference
of the means of the workers’ ability, then the firm expects the distribution of ∆𝑦 to be
normally distributed as𝑁(∆𝑎+∆𝜃, 𝜗). Let the variance of 𝑦𝐿𝑖1 be 𝜏𝑖, then 𝜏𝑖 = 𝜎2𝑖 +(𝜑𝐿𝑖 )
2.
Given the period 1 outputs, the firm and both workers update their beliefs about both
the ability of workers as:
𝐸 (𝜃𝑖 ∣ 𝑦𝐿𝑥1, 𝑦𝐿𝑧1, 𝑎𝐿𝑥1, 𝑎𝐿𝑧1) = 𝜃𝑖 + 𝐴𝑖 (𝑦
𝐿
𝑖1 − 𝜃𝑖 − 𝑎𝐿𝑖1) + 𝐵𝑖 (𝑦
𝐿
𝑖1 − 𝜃𝑘 − 𝑎𝐿𝑘1) , (3.1)








𝜎2𝑖 𝜏𝑘 + 𝜎2𝑘(𝜑𝐿𝑖 )





𝜏𝑖𝜏𝑘 − 𝜌2(𝜑𝐿𝑖 )
2(𝜑𝐿𝑘 )
2 (3.3)
Since period 2 is the last period, neither worker exerts any effort. Therefore the
wages equal the expected outputs conditional on no effort. The promoted worker 𝑖
gets
𝑊𝑖 = 𝐸 (𝑦𝐻𝑖 ∣ 𝑦𝐿𝑥1, 𝑦𝐿𝑧1, 𝑎𝐿𝑥1, 𝑎𝐿𝑧1) = 𝛾𝐸 (𝜃𝑖 ∣ 𝑦𝐿𝑥1, 𝑦𝐿𝑧1, 𝑎𝐿𝑥1, 𝑎𝐿𝑧1) (3.4)
The unpromoted worker 𝑘 gets
𝑤𝑘2 = 𝐸 (𝑦𝐿𝑘2 ∣ 𝑦𝐿𝑥1, 𝑦𝐿𝑧1, 𝑎𝐿𝑥1, 𝑎𝐿𝑧1) = 𝐸 (𝜃𝑘 ∣ 𝑦𝐿𝑥1, 𝑦𝐿𝑧1, 𝑎𝐿𝑥1, 𝑎𝐿𝑧1) (3.5)
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Since the workers exert effort only in period 1, we drop the superscript 𝐿 from the
effort terms 𝑎𝐿𝑖1, and from the variance terms 𝜑𝐿𝑖1. In period 1, the two workers choose
effort simultaneously. Denote by 𝑏𝑧 worker 𝑥‵𝑠 conjecture about 𝑧‵𝑠 effort, and 𝑏𝑥
worker 𝑧‵𝑠 conjecture about x‵𝑠 effort. From worker 𝑥‵𝑠 point of view, ∆𝑦 is distributed
as 𝑁(𝑎𝑥1 − 𝑏𝑧 + ∆𝜃, 𝜗); and from 𝑧‵𝑠 view, the distribution is 𝑁(𝑏𝑥 − 𝑎𝑧1 + ∆𝜃, 𝜗). Let
𝑔( ∙ ) be the density function of ∆𝑦, then before worker 𝑥 chooses his effort, his total
expected utility is
𝑈𝑥 = (𝑎𝑥1, 𝑏𝑧) = 𝑤𝑥1 +∫
∞
𝑐
𝑊𝑥𝑔 (∆𝑦 ∣ 𝑎𝑥1, 𝑏𝑧) 𝑑∆𝑦+∫
𝑐
−∞




Where the second term is his expected income from being promoted, which occurs if
∆𝑦 > 𝑐, and the third term the expected income if not. Similarly worker 𝑧‵𝑠 expected
utility is
𝑈𝑧 = (𝑎𝑧1, 𝑏𝑥) = 𝑤𝑧1 +∫
𝑐
−∞
𝑊𝑧𝑔 (∆𝑦 ∣ 𝑎𝑧1, 𝑏𝑥) 𝑑∆𝑦+∫
∞
𝑐




To simplify the above equations, we normalize the distribution 𝑔( ∙ ) to be standard
normal by the transformation
𝛼𝑥 (∆𝑦, 𝑎𝑥1,𝑏𝑧) =
∆𝑦 − 𝐸[∆𝑦| 𝑎𝑥1, 𝑏𝑧]
√𝜗
𝛼𝑧 (∆𝑦, 𝑎𝑧1,𝑏𝑥) =
∆𝑦 − 𝐸[∆𝑦| 𝑎𝑧1, 𝑏𝑥]
√𝜗
then we have
𝑈𝑥 (𝑎𝑥1, 𝑏𝑧) = 𝑤𝑥1 + 𝛾 [𝜃𝑥 + 𝐴𝑥 (𝑎𝑥1 − 𝑎𝑥1) + 𝐵𝑥 (𝑏𝑧 − 𝑎𝑧1)] , [1 − ∅(𝛼𝑥 (𝑐, 𝑎𝑥1, 𝑏𝑧))]
+ [𝜃𝑥 + 𝐴𝑥 (𝑎𝑥1 − 𝑎𝑥1) + 𝐵𝑥 (𝑏𝑧 − 𝑎𝑧1)]∅ (𝛼𝑥 (𝑐, 𝑎𝑥1, 𝑏𝑧))
+ (𝛾−1) 𝜎2𝑥






𝑈𝑧 (𝑎𝑧1, 𝑏𝑥) = 𝑤𝑧1 + 𝛾 [𝜃𝑧 + 𝐴𝑧 (𝑎𝑧1 − 𝑎𝑧1) + 𝐵𝑧 (𝑏𝑥 − 𝑎𝑥1)]∅ (𝛼𝑧 (𝑐, 𝑎𝑧1, 𝑏𝑥))]
+ [𝜃𝑧 + 𝐴𝑧 (𝑎𝑧1 − 𝑎𝑧1) + 𝐵𝑧 (𝑏𝑥 − 𝑎𝑥1)] , [1 − ∅(𝛼𝑧 (𝑐, 𝑎𝑧1, 𝑏𝑥))]
+ (𝛾−1) 𝜎2𝑧
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Where ∅( ∙ ) and ( ∙ ) are respectively the cumulative density and probability den-
sity function of the standard normal distribution. Worker 𝑥 chooses 𝑎𝑥1 to maximizes
𝑈𝑥(𝑎𝑥1, 𝑏𝑧) and 𝑧 chooses 𝑎𝑧1 to maximize 𝑈𝑧 (𝑎𝑧1, 𝑏𝑥) . Denote by {𝑎∗𝑥1, 𝑎∗𝑧1} the Nash
equilibrium in this stage, then 𝑏𝑖 = 𝑎∗𝑖1; namely both have perfect foresight about the
other’s effort. Furthermore, the firm has perfect foresight about bothworkers’ effort as
well: 𝑏𝑖 = 𝑎∗𝑖1 = 𝑎𝑖1 . Since 𝛼𝑥 (𝑐,𝑎∗𝑥1, 𝑎∗𝑧1) = 𝛼𝑧 (𝑐,𝑎∗𝑥1, 𝑎∗𝑧1), denote by 𝛼(𝑐) the equilibrium
value of 𝛼𝑖:
𝛼 (𝑐) =
𝑐 − 𝐸[∆𝑦| 𝑎∗𝑥1, 𝑎∗𝑧1]
√𝜗




Where ∆𝑎∗ = 𝑎∗𝑥1 − 𝑎∗𝑧1. Since 𝜑(𝛼 (𝑐) ) is the probability that worker 𝑧 is promoted, and
1−𝜑 (𝛼 (𝑐)) is the probability that 𝑥 is promoted. If 𝛼 (𝑐) <0, then worker 𝑥 has a greater
chance to be promoted than 𝑧; and vice versa. Given 𝑐, the first order condition (The
second order condition is satisfied when 𝛽 is large enough) of maximizing 𝑈𝑥 (𝑎𝑥1, 𝑏𝑧)
with respect to 𝑎𝑥1 in (3.8),evaluated at 𝑏𝑖 = 𝑎∗𝑖1 = 𝑎𝑖1, is
𝛾𝐴𝑥 [1 − 𝜑 (𝛼 (𝑐))] + 𝐴𝑥𝜑 (𝛼 (𝑐)) + (𝛾 − 1) 𝜑 (𝛼 (𝑐))
𝜃𝑥
√𝜗







We say that the rule favors 𝑥 (𝑧) formally if 𝑐 < 0 (𝑐 > 0), and that the rule favors
𝑥(𝑧) in probability if 𝛼 (𝑐) <0(> 0). The right-hand side in (3.11) is the marginal cost of
effort to worker 𝑥, and the left-hand side the incentive to work. There are three kinds
of incentives. First is the career concern, including the increase in the expected payoffs
from job 𝐻 (the first term) and job 𝐿 (the second term) in period 2.
The larger 𝛼(𝑐) is, the smaller the probability of 𝑥 being promoted and therefore the
smaller the career concern. When 𝛼 (𝑐) goes to infinity, 𝑥 will be stuck with job 𝐿 for
sure in period 2, and he only cares about the expected wage in job 𝐿. In the other
extreme, when 𝛼(𝑐) goes to negative infinity, 𝑥 is guaranteed the job 𝐻 . Since 𝛾 > 1,
he works harder the higher the probability that he gets promoted. Lazear and Rosen
(1981) argue that it might be optimal to adopt a handicap system to discriminate against
the more able worker so that both contestants would have incentive to keep on racing.
When workers have career concern, the handicap system might not be necessary.
The second incentive comes from the tournament effect, which is the third term.
When 𝛼(𝑐) is zero, where 𝜑(𝛼 (𝑐) ) is the largest, the competition is fiercest since each
has equal chance of winning job 𝐻 . As 𝛼(𝑐) goes to the two tails, 𝜑( ∙ ) decreases and
so does the competition.
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The third effect is in the last term, whichwe call it the hungry-dog-and-fat-cat effect
(We borrow the animal names from Fudenberg & Tirole, 1984.). When 𝛼 (𝑐) = 0, the
effect disappear. When 𝛼 (𝑐) >0, the promotion rule favors 𝑧, but worker 𝑥 exerts more
effort instead (hungry dog). And when 𝛼 (𝑐) <0, 𝑥 decreases his effort although he
is favored (fat cat). Note that this effect is absent in models considering only career
concern or tournament. Similarly, the first order condition (evaluated at 𝑏𝑖 = 𝑎∗𝑖1 = 𝑎𝑖1)
for worker 𝑧‵𝑠 effort 𝑎𝑧1 includes the above effects too.
𝛾𝐴𝑧𝜑 (𝛼 (𝑐)) + 𝐴𝑧 [1 − 𝜑 (𝛼 (𝑐))] + (𝛾 − 1) 𝜑 (𝛼 (𝑐))
𝜃𝑧
√𝜗







The Nash equilibrium {𝑎∗𝑥1, 𝑎∗𝑧1} is the solution to the simultaneous equations (3.11) and
(3.12).
4. Comparative Statics
To solve the firm’s optimal formal promotion rule c, we need to know first how the
efforts of workers varies with the rule. Rewrite (3.11) and (3.12) as
𝐹𝑥 (𝑎∗𝑥1, 𝑎∗𝑧1) = 𝛾𝐴𝑥 [1 − 𝜑 (𝛼 (𝑐))] + 𝐴𝑥𝜑 (𝛼 (𝑐))
+ (𝛾 − 1) 𝜇 (𝛼 (𝑐)) 𝜃𝑥
√𝜗







𝐹𝑧 (𝑎∗𝑥1, 𝑎∗𝑧1) = 𝛾𝐴𝑧𝜑 (𝛼 (𝑐)) + 𝐴𝑧 [1 − 𝜑 (𝛼 (𝑐))]
+ (𝛾 − 1) 𝜇 (𝛼 (𝑐)) 𝜃𝑧
√𝜗
































where ∪ = (𝜕𝐹𝑥/𝜕𝑎𝑥1) (𝜕𝐹𝑧/𝜕𝑎𝑧1) − (𝜕𝐹𝑥/𝜕𝑎𝑧1) (𝜕𝐹𝑧/𝜕𝑎𝑥1) and is assumed to be positive

























Let 𝑃𝑖 = √𝜗𝜃𝑖/𝜎2𝑖 , 𝑄𝑖 = (𝜗1.5𝐴𝑖 − 𝜎2𝑖 )/𝜎2𝑖 , 𝑖 = 𝑥, 𝑧, then the sign of (4.5) is determined
by the sign of the quadratic function 𝑓𝑥 (𝛼) = 𝛼2 + 𝛼𝑃𝑥 + 𝑄𝑥, and the sign of (4.6) by
𝑓𝑧 (𝛼) = 𝛼2−𝛼𝑃𝑧+𝑄𝑧. We say that the mean of worker 𝑖‵𝑠 ability is large (small) if 𝑃 2𝑖 >
(<) 4𝑄𝑖. When both workers’ ability is small, 𝑓𝑖 (𝛼) > 0 0 for all 𝛼. When both workers’
ability is large, there are two roots of 𝑓𝑥 (𝛼) = 0 and two of 𝑓𝑧 (𝛼) = 0, from which we
can define the following five sections (note that the first two roots are negative, and
the other two positive):
𝑆1 = (
−∞,
−𝑃𝑥 − (𝑃 2𝑥 − 4𝑄𝑥)0.5
2 ]
, 𝑆2 = [
−𝑃𝑥 − (𝑃 2𝑥 − 4𝑄𝑥)0.5
2 ,
−𝑃𝑥 + (𝑃 2𝑥 − 4𝑄𝑥)0.5
2 ]
𝑆3 = [
−𝑃𝑥 + (𝑃 2𝑥 − 4𝑄𝑥)0.5
2 ,
𝑃𝑧 − (𝑃 2𝑧 − 4𝑄𝑧)0.5
2 ]
𝑆4 = [
𝑃𝑧 − (𝑃 2𝑧 − 4𝑄𝑧)0.5
2 ,
𝑃𝑧 + (𝑃 2𝑧 − 4𝑄𝑧)0.5
2 ]
, 𝑆5 = [
𝑃𝑧 + (𝑃 2𝑧 − 4𝑄𝑧)0.5
2 ,∞]
(4.7)
We then have the next result.
Proposition 1. ∆𝑎∗ decreases with 𝑐, and 𝛼‵ (𝑐) >0.
Proposition 1 says that the gap of the two workers’ effort narrows when the promo-
tion rule favors 𝑧 more (𝑐 larger), and that 𝑐 has a one-to-one relationship with 𝛼(𝑐).
But we do not know whether the result is due to that 𝑥works harder and 𝑧 gets lazier,
both work harder but 𝑧 works more, or both work less but x lazier. So we need the
next proposition.
Proposition 2. If both workers’ mean ability is large, then when 𝛼 (𝑐) ∈𝑆2, 𝜕𝑎∗21/𝜕𝑐 >
𝜕𝑎∗11/𝜕𝑐, and when 𝛼©∈𝑆4 , 𝜕𝑎∗21/𝜕𝑐 < 𝜕𝑎∗11/𝜕𝑐 < 0. If both workers’ mean ability is small,
then 𝜕𝑎∗21/𝜕𝑐 > 0 > 𝜕𝑎∗11/𝜕𝑐.
Since 𝛼(𝑐) increases with 𝑐, and 𝑥(𝑧) is favored in probability when 𝛼(𝑐)∈𝑆2(𝑆4), the
first two parts of proposition 2 says that when both workers’ expected ability is large,
and worker 𝑖 is favored in probability, then increasing further the advantage of the
favored would reduce both workers’ effort, but 𝑘, the unfavored, reduces more than 𝑖.
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When both workers’ expected ability is small, changing the formal rule to favor 𝑖would
increase 𝑖‵𝑠 effort while reduce 𝑘‵𝑠 effort. Next we examine workers’ incentive in the
extreme cases to gain more intuition. We say that 𝑥(𝑧) is almost sure to be promoted
if 𝛼 (𝑐) → −∞(∞) .
5. Promotion Rule and the Firm’s Goal
Viewing promotion as the reward to a tournament, Lazear and Rosen (1981) propose
that the firmmight need to handicap the leader in order tomaintain the intensity of the
competition, without which neither the leader nor the followers have much incentive
to work. However, in a setting where workers’ effort is not a concern and the firm only
wants to find the best one among his employees, Meyer (1991) shows that the firm
should, during the later rounds, give advantage to the leader in the early rounds of
tournament. The purpose of the bias is to make the results of the tournament more
informative. In this section we will analyze how the firm should design his promotion
rule to fit his goal. Both tournament and career concerns affect the incentive ofworkers
to work. In proposition 3, we have shown that a worker still has incentive to work even
though he is almost sure to win. T
His extreme case implies that lack of intensity of competition does not reduce the
workers’ effort as much as in the pure tournament models. On the other hand, favoring
an early leader may or may not reduce workers’ incentive. When the firm cares more
about picking the right person for job 𝐻 , one might expect that the promotion rule
is closer to Meyer’s (1991) prescription. Yet we find that it is not the firm’s goal that
decides the optimal promotion rule.
It is instead the difference between the means and the variance of workers’ ability
that decides the rule. We first discuss the optimal rule when the firm cares only about
picking the best person; that is, the firm wants to maximize his period-2 output. Then
we analyze the optimal rule when he wants to maximize his period-1 output.
5.1. Promotion as a screening device
Suppose that the firm cares only about his period-2 output. Since the workers do not
exert any effort in period 2, the firm wants to choose the worker with higher ability.
His optimal promotion rule is then the value of 𝑐 that maximizes the probability that
the worker who wins the tournament in period 1 has higher ability.
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Let the prior distribution of the workers’ ability difference be 𝑚(𝜃), and the condi-
tional probability density function of their output difference be ℎ (∆𝑦 ∣ ∆𝜃), then






ℎ (∆𝑦 ∣ ∆𝜃) = 1
√2𝜋𝑉(𝜃)
exp [
−(∆𝑦 − ∆𝑎 − ∆𝜃)2
2𝑉(∆𝜀) ] (5.1)
The firm chooses 𝑐 to maximize 𝑇 =𝑃𝑟 (𝑥 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠 ∣ 𝜃𝑥 > 𝜃𝑧) + 𝑃𝑟 (𝑧 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠 ∣ 𝜃𝑧 > 𝜃𝑥) ,
where 𝑃𝑟(𝑆) stands for the probability of the event 𝑆:










ℎ (∆𝑦 ∣ ∆𝜃) 𝑑∆𝑦𝑚 (∆𝜃) 𝑑∆𝜃
(5.2)
subject to the constraints that workers’ effort is 𝑎∗𝑥1 and 𝑎∗𝑧1, both of which are functions






ℎ (𝑐 ∣ ∆𝜃)𝑚 (∆𝜃) 𝑑∆𝜃 −∫
∞
0
ℎ (𝑐 ∣ ∆𝜃)𝑚 (∆𝜃) 𝑑∆𝜃] = 0 (5.3)
Let the posterior density function of ∆𝜃 given that ∆𝑦 = be ?̂? (∆𝜃 ∣ 𝜔), then we have
?̂? (∆𝜃 ∣ 𝜔) = ℎ (∆𝑦 ∣ ∆𝜃)𝑚 (∆𝜃)𝑔(𝜔)
where 𝑔(𝜔) is the density function of the normal distribution𝑁 (∆𝑎
∗+∆𝜃, 𝜗) , and that
?̂? (∆𝜃 ∣ 𝜔) is the density function of the normal distribution 𝑁 (𝜇(𝜔), 𝑣2), where
𝜇 (𝜔) =
𝑉 (∆𝜃) (𝜔 − ∆𝑎∗) + 𝑉(∆𝜀)∆𝜃
𝜗






𝑔(𝑐)?̂? (∆𝜃) 𝑑∆𝜃 −∫
∞
0
𝑔(𝑐)?̂? (∆𝜃) 𝑑∆𝜃] = 0
If we let 𝑍 (∆𝜃 ∣ 𝑐) = (∆𝜃 − 𝜇(𝑐))/𝑣, where ?̂? (∆𝜃) = 𝜑(𝑍 (∆𝜃 ∣ 𝑐) is the density
function of the standard normal distribution. The first order condition now becomes
(1 −
𝜕∆𝑎∗
𝜕𝑐 ) 𝑔 (𝑐) [2∅(
−𝜇 (𝑐)
𝑣 ) − 1] = 0 (5.4)
Suppose that 𝜕∆𝑎∗/𝜕𝑐 ≠ 1, then the firm must set (𝑐) = 0 (so that ∅(−𝜇(𝑐)𝑣 ) = 0.5, or
𝑐 = ∆𝑎∗ (𝑐) − 𝑉 (∆𝜀)𝑉(∆𝜃) ∆𝜃 (5.5)
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From proposition 1, we know that ∆𝑎∗ decreases with 𝑐. Therefore (5.5) defines the
optimal 𝑐 implicitly, which we denote by 𝑐𝑝. In Figure 1 we draw two possible values of
𝑐𝑝, one is positive and the other is negative. Condition (5.5) says that to maximize the
probability that the winner is the more capable worker, the firm’s promotion rule is a
weighted average of ∆𝑎∗, the effort difference of the workers in equilibrium, and ∆𝜃,
the difference of the means of the workers’ ability. In an extreme case, if 𝑉 (∆𝜀)/𝑉 (∆𝜃)
goes to zero, then the variance of ∆𝑦 should come from ∆𝑎∗ and so 𝑐𝑝 is set to offset
the effort difference. On the other hand, if 𝑉 (∆𝜀)/𝑉 (∆𝜃) is large, then 𝑐𝑝 should give
more consideration to ∆𝜃.
Proposition 3.
1. If 𝜑𝑥 = 𝜑𝑧 and = 1, then 𝑐𝑝 = ∆𝑎∗ and 𝑇 = 1.
2. If 𝑉(∆𝜃) → ∞, then 𝑐𝑝 = ∆𝑎∗, but 𝑇 < 1.
3. If 𝑉 (∆𝜀)/𝑉 (∆𝜃) → ∞, then 𝑐𝑝 → ∞ if ∆𝜃 > 0, and 𝑐𝑝 → −∞ if ∆𝜃 < 0.
4. If ∆𝜃 = 0, 𝜑𝑥 = 𝜑𝑧, 𝜌 = 1, and 𝜎𝑥 = 𝜎𝑧, then 𝑐𝑝 = 0.
5. 𝛼(𝑐𝑝) is positive if ∆𝜃 is negative, and vice versa.
Proof. Parts (1) to (3) follow directly from (5.5). When the condition in part (4) holds,




1 + 𝑉 (∆𝜀)𝑉 (∆𝜃)]
Part (5) of proposition 4 can complement Meyer’s (1991) promotion rule. In a setting
where workers’ outputs are independent of effort, Meyer shows that to maximize the
probability that the firm promotes the most capable worker, the firm should give edge
to leader of early rounds of competition over the followers; that is, setting 𝑐 < 0 if 𝑥 is
the leader. In our setting, the sign of 𝑐𝑝 has no fixed relationship with the sign of ∆𝜃,
while the sign of 𝛼(𝑐𝑝) is the opposite of ∆𝜃. Hence, the early leader (the one whose
expected ability is larger) enjoys the edge in probability term instead of nominal term.
DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i10.3481 Page 1427
ICOI-2018
5.2. Promotion as an incentive device
Suppose that the firm does not care about his period-2 output, and uses promotion
solely to maximize period-1 outputs. Since the period-1 wages are independent of
outputs, the firm’s problem is
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐶
𝑎∗𝑥1 (𝑐) + 𝑎∗𝑧1 (𝑐)
where 𝑎∗𝑥1 (𝑐) and 𝑎∗𝑧1 (𝑐) are the solution to (3.11) and (3.12). From (4.1) and (4.2), we
have
𝛽 (𝑎∗𝑥1 (𝑐) +𝑎∗𝑧1 (𝑐)) ≡ (𝛾 − 1) (𝐴𝑧 − 𝐴𝑥)∅ (𝛼 (𝑐)) + 𝛾𝐴𝑥 + 𝐴𝑧
+(𝛾 − 1) 𝜇 (𝛼 (𝑐))
√𝜗
(𝜃𝑥 + 𝜃𝑧) +





Let 𝐿(𝛼(𝑐)) denote the right hand side of (5.6). Since 𝑐 affects 𝐿(𝛼(𝑐)) only through 𝛼(𝑐),
the firm’s objective becomes maximizing 𝐿(𝛼(𝑐)) by 𝛼(𝑐). The first order condition is
𝐿‵ (𝛼 (𝑐)) = − (𝛾 − 1) 𝜇 (𝛼 (𝑐))𝜗 [(𝜎
2
𝑥 − 𝜎2𝑧) (𝛼 (𝑐))2 +√𝜗(𝜃𝑥 + 𝜃𝑧) 𝛼 (𝑐)
+𝜗 (𝐴𝑧−𝐴𝑥) − (𝜎2𝑥 − 𝜎2𝑧)] = 0
(5.7)
and the second derivative of 𝐿 is
𝐿‶ (𝛼 (𝑐)) = (𝛾 − 1) 𝜇 (𝛼 (𝑐))𝜗 [(𝜎
2
𝑥 − 𝜎2𝑧) (𝛼(𝑐)3 − 3𝛼(𝑐)) + √𝜗(𝜃𝑥 + 𝜃𝑧) (𝛼 (𝑐)
2 − 1)
+𝜗 (𝐴𝑧−𝐴𝑥) 𝛼(𝑐)]
Denote the terms in the square brackets of (5.7) by the function l(𝛼(𝑐)), then 𝐿‵ = 0
if and only if 𝑙 = 0. Let the solution be 𝛼(𝑐𝜋), then the second order condition requires
that
𝐿‶ (𝛼 (𝑐)) = −2𝛼(𝑐𝜋)(𝜎2𝑥 − 𝜎2𝑧) − √𝜗(𝜃𝑥 + 𝜃𝑧) < 0 (5.8)
Since l(𝛼(𝑐)) is a quadratic function of 𝛼(𝑐), 𝑙 = 0 has roots if and only if
𝑅 ≡ 𝜗(𝜃𝑥 + 𝜃𝑧)
2
− 4(𝜎2𝑥 − 𝜎2𝑧)[𝜗 (𝐴𝑧−𝐴𝑥) − (𝜎2𝑥 − 𝜎2𝑧)] ≥ 0
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We summarize a few special cases in the next proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose that 𝑅≥0.
1. If 𝜑2𝑥=𝜑 2𝑧 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎2𝑥 > (𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑙𝑦 <) 𝜎2𝑧 , then 𝛼 (𝑐𝜋) > (𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑙𝑦 <) 0
2. If 𝜎2𝑥 = 𝜎2𝑧 , then 𝛼(𝑐𝜋) = √𝜗 (𝐴𝑥−𝐴𝑧)/𝜃𝑥 + 𝜃𝑧, which is positive (negative)
if 𝜑2𝑧>(<)𝜑2𝑥.
3. If 𝜎2𝑥 = 𝜎2𝑧 and 𝜑2𝑥=𝜑 2𝑧 , then 𝛼(𝑐𝜋) = 0.
4. If 𝜎2𝑥 = 𝜎2𝑧 , 𝜑2𝑥=𝜑2𝑧,= 1, and 𝜃𝑥 = 𝜃𝑧, then𝛼 (𝑐𝜋) = 𝑐𝜋 = 0.
Proof. If 𝜑2𝑥=𝜑 2𝑧 , then from the definition of 𝐴𝑖 in (3.2), we have
𝜎2𝑥 > (<, =) 𝜎2𝑧 ↔ 𝐴𝑧 > (<, =)𝐴𝑥
which proves part (1). Part (2) follows from (5.7). The condition in part (3) implies that
𝐴𝑥= 𝐴𝑧, and hence by part (2), 𝛼(𝑐𝜋) = 0. Part (4) follows from part (3) and (3.10).
5.3. Comparisons
We have shown the optimal promotion rules for the two different goals of the firm.
Here we shall compare how the two rules, 𝑐𝑝 and 𝑐𝜋 , differ. We start with some special
cases. From part (5) of proposition 4, we know that to maximize the probability that
the best worker is promoted, the promotion rule favors the leader (the one with
higher expected ability) in probability. But from proposition 5, we see that when the
firm wants to maximize period-1 outputs, the optimal promotion probability does not
depend on Δ𝜃. This illustrates why there is a conflict for a promotion rule to serve
both incentive and screening purposes. However, the two optimal rules might favor
the same worker. The next corollary summarizes these cases.
Corollary 1. 𝛼(𝑐𝑝) and 𝛼(𝑐𝜋) have the same signs in the following cases:
1. If Δ𝜃 = 0, 𝜎𝑥 = 𝜎𝑧, and 𝜑𝑥 = 𝜑𝑧, then 𝛼 (𝑐𝑝) = 𝛼 (𝑐𝜋) = 0.
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2. If Δ𝜃 > 0 (𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑦 < 0), 𝜑𝑥 = 𝜑𝑧, and 𝜎𝑥 < (𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑦 >) 𝜎𝑧, then both 𝛼 (𝑐𝑝)
and 𝛼 (𝑐𝜋) are negative (respectively, positive).
3. If Δ𝜃 > 0 (𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑦 < 0), 𝜎𝑥 = 𝜎𝑧, and 𝜑𝑥 > (𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑦 < 0) , then both𝛼 (𝑐𝑝)
and 𝛼 (𝑐𝜋) are negative (respectively, positive).
6. Conclusion
We have developed a model of promotion that encompasses both career concerns and
tournament effect. We first shows that workers’ effort incentive is not only affected by
both career concerns and tournament effect, but also a combinative effect. Then we
analyze how the firm’s promotion rules should vary with his goals and the parameters.
When the firmwants to pick the best worker, the promotion rule favors in probability
the worker with higher expected ability. When the firmwants to maximize his period-1
outputs, the promotion rule might favor either worker, depending on the variances of
their ability and the disturbance. Since the latter rule does not depend on the workers’
expected difference of ability, the two rules can differ. However, under some condi-
tions, the two rules are consistent; namely the two rules both favor the same worker.
References
[1] Baker, G., Jensen, M. and Murphy, K. 1988. Compensation and incentives: Practice
vs. theory, Journal of Finance pp. 593–616.
[2] Costa, J. E. R. I. 1988. Managerial task assignment and promotions, Econometrica:
Journal of the Econometric Society pp. 449–466.
[3] Dewatripont, M., Jewitt, I. and Tirole, J. 1999. The economics of career concerns, part
i: Comparing information structures, Review of Economic Studies 66(1): 183–198.
[4] Fairburn, J. and Malcomson, J. 1994. Rewarding performance by promotion to a
different job, European Economic Review 38(3-4): 683–690.
[5] Fairburn, J. and Malcomson, J. 2001. Performance, promotion, and the peter
principle, Review of Economic Studies 68(1): 45–66.
[6] Fama, E. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm, The Journal of Political
Economy pp. 288–307.
[7] Freixax, X., Guesnerie, R. and Tirole, J. 1985. Planning under incomplete information
and the ratchet effect, Review of Economic Studies 52: 173–191.
DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i10.3481 Page 1430
ICOI-2018
[8] Gibbons, R. and Murphy, K. 1992. Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of
career concerns: Theory and evidence, The Journal of Political Economy 100(3):
468–505.
[9] Green, J. and Stokey, N. 1983. A comparison of tournaments and contracts, The
Journal of Political Economy 91(3): 349–364.
[10] Holmstrom, B. 1999. Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective, The
Review of Economic Studies 66(1): 169.
[11] Holmstrom, B. and Costa, J. R. I. 1986. Managerial incentives and capital manage-
ment, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 101(4): 835–860.
[12] Holmstrom, B. and Milgrom, P. 1991. Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive
contracts, asset ownership and job design, Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization 7: 24–52.
[13] Lazear, E. P. and Rosen, S. 1981. Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor
contracts, The Journal of Political Economy pp. 841–864.
[14] Malcomson, J. 1984. Work incentives, hierarchy, and internal labor markets, The
Journal of Political Economy pp. 486–507.
[15] Medoff, J. L. and Abraham, K. G. 1980. Experience, performance, and earnings, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 95(4): 703–736.
[16] Meyer, M. 1991. Learning from coarse information: Biased contests and career
profiles, The Review of Economic Studies 58(1): 15.
[17] Meyer, M. and Vickers, J. 1997. Performance comparisons and dynamic incentives,
Journal of Political Economy 105(3): 547–581.
[18] Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. 1992. Economics, organization and management, Vol. 7,
Prentice-hall Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i10.3481 Page 1431
